Conclusion

> What if people abroad do not want to be just like us? What if they adopt our methods, buy our products, watch our movies and television shows, listen to our music, eat our fast food, and visit our theme parks, but refuse to embrace our way of life? What if they insist on remaining "foreign," un-American, even anti-American?
>
> —Richard Pells, *Not Like Us,* xiv

The idea that the globe is being "Americanized" has been around for more than a century. In 1902 William T. Stead, a reform-minded English journalist, wrote a book titled *The Americanization of the World.* A thoroughgoing internationalist, Stead wanted Britons to overcome their snobbishness and to join with their former colony to enlighten the world culturally and financially. It would be a "race union" of English-speaking peoples, seated in the fatherland. In his book Stead reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of New World ways to his scheme. He admired Americans' reciprocity in trade—"benefits must be given if benefits are sought"—as well as the Monroe Doctrine, freethinking Protestantism, and the Americans' "host of ingenious inventions and admirably perfected machines which we are incapable of producing for ourselves."[1] However, he saw rather peculiar summits in American culture, singling out novelist Harriet Beecher Stowe, the painter Edwin Abbey, and marriage (noting that American wives were unusually common in the British cabinet).

Nevertheless Stead was on to one thing. As Inglehart, Hofstede, and others have since shown statistically, prosperity has spread to democratic, Protestant, English-speaking economies much more rapidly than to

the "Rhineland" and "Mediterranean" models, not to mention those of Asia. These cultures were more open to "modernity." But we shouldn't be misled into thinking that Stead was in any way prophetic. People had been using *Americanize* as a verb for 120 years before Stead suffixed it. Shortly after the Revolutionary War, it was used to describe two aspects of the new nation. On one hand, the united colonies needed to create a common culture and to embrace further self-fashioning. Even Benjamin Franklin underwent this process, as Gordon Wood details in *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin* (2004). To *Americanize* was also an internal dynamic of new citizens, carried forward by discussion, debate, and simple expediency. They needed systems of government, roads, trade, schools, and social conventions. What would these be? The strongest sense they had of themselves as "Americans" came from the contrasts they felt to their homelands (if they remembered them) and to newer immigrants, who were a serious problem. The latter soon became the major focus: how could the foreign-born pouring into the country be naturalized? From 1790 onward, dictionaries tell us, to *Americanize* meant to acculturate.

A second meaning of *Americanize* developed abroad, for the world watched the new country curiously. *Americo-mania* was a term used in the British press from 1798 through 1880. Foreign observers arrived and reported home that Americans now had certain distinct "characteristics," which one might call a culture. Glimpsing themselves in foreign mirrors, Americans took up the topic, with Crèvecoeur and Jefferson in the lead. Then the visiting Tocqueville, Dickens, and Mrs. Trollope wrote books on the curious ways of Americans, stressing their practicality, unpretentiousness, or bad manners. By the mid-1800s, to *Americanize* was common parlance. Novelist William Dean Howells offered no explanation when he wrote in 1875 that one of his foreign characters "was Americanizing in that good lady's hands as fast as she could transform him."[2]

These two uses continued into the early 1900s. For U.S. citizens, *Americanize* meant to acculturate immigrants through English classes, cooking lessons, and instruction in hygiene, which were delivered by government, women's groups, and religious charities. They undertook such activities with evangelic zeal, contributing to cultural nativism and diplomatic isolationism rather than any colonial exploits. But for Stead—who never visited the United States—Americanization consisted of externally visible cultural and economic traits. The United States emphasized education, personal incentives, freethinking in religion, and democracy. Unlike most European nations it could feed itself, and it embraced labor-

saving machines. Like China today, it was then flooding the world with "cheap goods" (which Stead courageously defended). By linking up with such a culture, he argued, Anglo-Protestantism could be extended not only to Ireland, South Africa, Canada, and Australia, but throughout the Americas, Asia, and Africa—while headquartered, of course, in Britain. There was no sense in *The Americanization of the World* that American culture, popular or otherwise, was exportable, and Stead made scant mention of the McCormick reaper, the transcontinental railroads, the telephone, the stock and commodity exchanges, the automobile, or other American technological advances.

World War I produced a new understanding of Americanization. European allies turned first to the United States for food and matériel, becoming aware not only of deep resources but also of American logistical prowess. Men followed, millions of them, a debt that more conscientious Europeans realized could never be repaid. As Luigi Barzini and Paul Fussell have pointed out, contact with U.S. soldiers changed forever the remoteness associated with America. Now it had a human face, which loved jazz and films and cars, which detested filth and pessimism. But the reparations and war debts that followed—administered by American banks and administrators—made those consumer goods hard for Europeans to obtain. As Richard Pells has argued, European intellectuals especially resented the ways in which their lives seemed diminished after the war.

It is not surprising, then, that academic studies of Americanization often begin in Europe during this period. But aside from a little jazz and film, Americans hadn't left much of their culture behind between 1917, when the United States entered the war, and 1932, when most of "The Lost Generation" departed. Studies that attempt to show otherwise usually end up choking on the exhaust of Teddy Roosevelt's speeches or vaporous "influences." But that period *was* the entering wedge of *modernity* in Europe, as the "masses" pressed for indoor toilets, stoves, autos, tractors, and phonographs. They had seen and heard that Americans had these things. In order to achieve comparable material progress, European governments and businesses began to blend in American models. As Ton von Schaik has written, "The economic successes of the US in the past century triggered imitation by other countries, not only imitation of American technology but also of the American rules of the game. Imitating, however, is not to be understood as copying literally. New rules melt gradually into existing rules, which are inherently linked with the cultural heritage of a country."[3] For some European intellectuals, it didn't matter whether the change was domestic "modernization"

or "Americanization." The changes ran counter to Marx, who had predicted that the masses would arise to overthrow their masters. To such critics it seemed that governments had discovered new and unfair methods of preventing the millennium. They developed a special distaste for American popular culture, which they said created a "false consciousness" of well-being, and they grafted this on to their disappointment.

In the 1930s some of these critics, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, emigrated to the United States to escape Nazism. The first two returned after the war and became central to the Frankfurt School, where Horkheimer attacked the "corruption of local traditions" by professional sports and the "loss of local autonomy" in mass communications. Adorno famously disparaged American music: "Jazz is a form of manneristic interpretation. As with fashions, what is important is show, not the thing itself. . . . Jazz, like everything else in the culture industry, gratifies desires only to frustrate them at the same time."[4] For the masses Adorno championed Schoenberg's twelve-tone scale. Marcuse stayed in the United States and taught at the University of California at San Diego, where he popularized the idea that this "culture industry" controlled things. Meanwhile Erich Fromm argued that advertising, not religion, was the opiate of the masses, stifling the critical capacities of the customer.

These critics, along with Louis Althusser in France and Antonio Gramsci in Italy, succeeded in emptying Americanization of its previous meanings and imposing their own stamp on it. Enter "Americanization" into Google.com's search engine today, and it will return more than 284,000 hits. Most of them are cultural "diagnoses" inflected by the Frankfurt School: the Americanization of aid to Africa, of British welfare, of German steel, of the Holocaust, of abstract expressionism, of British Columbia's forests, of pho, of reggae. Most people have accepted the neo-Marxian conflation of modernity, globalization, and Americanization. Lawrence Grossberg asks at *Keywords* (an update of Raymond Williams's Marxian lexicon) if globalization isn't "American capitalist culture replacing and destroying all local and indigenous forms of cultural expression?"[5]

This misperception arises from a particular set of cultural circumstances, which we need to get beyond in order to see globalization for what it is and what it is not. Curiously, Americans are unaware of globalization at home. But Americans traveling abroad, especially critics, tend to see Americanization everywhere. Yet by definition globalization is occurring globally. For most of us globalization is never about the

changes occurring to *us,* but about change in Others. Theorist Wolfgang Iser has written that "in a rapidly shrinking world, many different cultures have come into close contact with one another, calling for a mutual understanding in terms not only of one's own culture but also of those encountered. The more alien the latter, the more inevitable is some form of translation, as the specific nature of the culture one is exposed to can be grasped only when projected onto what is familiar."[6]

We can see this "translation" in the writing that conflates modernity and Americanization from Stead onward. Stead used America to project change onto the late British Empire, and critics today use Ghana or Thailand to project change onto the United States. In the "marketplace of interpretation," as Iser calls it, these critics work out of their own preexisting personal *habitus* in order to translate their own relative advantages into something like penitence for like-minded readers. It has become a genre—the dystopia of modernity—in which Western "materialism" leads to personal lack of fulfillment *because* masses of "subaltern" peoples work in "sweatshop conditions" to make shoes or chairs or computers.

That's most of what we see when we Google "Americanization" plus anything: some version of the dystopia of success. Unfortunately, this genre provides a narrow lens through which to see the reality of broadband, instant *ramen,* and container ports. The result is that foreign cultures are not analyzed in their fullness, but reduced to a narrative function of this genre. We don't consider how Thais perceive logos, their habits of eating, of land use, of education, of saving and spending; their development and use of food technology, marketing, or their attitude toward the foreign. We have overlooked the *reception* of globalization.

Everywhere in such writing we find the assumption that other cultures are changing too rapidly for their own good. There is a kind of sympathetic projection of the critic's self onto the foreign culture. As Iser notes, "If the experience of crises, issuing into a critique of one's own culture, is meant to balance out the deficiencies diagnosed, recourse to other cultures proves to be a means of therapy for a growing awareness of cultural pathology."[7] This therapy locates self-reflection in the "stricken" foreign culture, which can then be used to redress oneself critically. There is a striking example in an academic book on Thai prostitution, in which the (male) author writes that "the [johns] look pink and flabby, and in the tropical heat (90 degrees in the 'cool' season), I've become very sensitive to the strong *farang* body odor, wondering if I smell like that too."[8] This study not only blames prostitution on globalization but also links it to Western concepts of masculinity.

In this case and others, the cultural pathology is not globalization, but the domestic dis-ease of educated Westerners with the speed of change. The cultural capital of scholars and critics lies in knowing traditions. In their new travels, the rest of the world no longer looks traditional or Other enough. Wherever they go, there are recognizable *signs:* Visa, Toyota, and Adidas. Mickey Mouse grins at the visitor in France and Japan. Taxi drivers and the hotel employees speak a little English. This is not what the educated Westerner goes abroad for, which is to get out of oneself and to encounter the Other. Hence the critiques tinged by a tone of regret for a past and an Other presumed to be fading. "Don't change," it implores, "Remain as you were." Implicit here is the critic's nostalgia for a lost personal authenticity. But what the Other's culture *was,* in all its premodern unpleasantness, and the critic's motive in reifying it, are never examined.

Earlier, in discussing the assumptions at work in such writing, I cited John Tomlinson's analysis. He reminds us that underlying the spread of globalization "is the spread of the culture of modernity itself" and that "the 'imaginary' discourse of cultural identity only arises within the context of modernity."[9] Perhaps this is too kind to those critics who, in his example, want to deny the Bushman a television. It is not the Bushman who has changed so much but the critics. This instantiation of change in the Bushman is best understood in the context of the critic's environment. In only 1980 few of them used computers, much less e-mail. The Xerox was expensive, there was no foreign travel budget, no DVD, no 401(k) retirement plan, no frequent flyer miles, and no Amazon.com. No one had heard of a leased auto or a "significant other." In fact, *no lives have changed as much in the past twenty-five years as those of Western critics of globalization.* What can it mean to have accepted such changes oneself, to most appearances uncritically, and yet to denounce their appearance in Others? Can someone located in a culture dominated by swift change even perceive accurately what is changing in a foreign culture?

The rate of change in the critics' lives has led to a sort of constant and recursive monitoring of the known as it appears in the Other. Is it a desire to slow the rate of change, to find a more stable subjectivity for oneself, that leads, paradoxically, to sightings of oneself and one's culture everywhere? Isn't this critique really a nostalgia for *authenticity,* which is always located outside the self? The critic implies the dire consequences of watching television, using computers, and eating at KFC. Of course, the critic could give up these things, but it is somehow more edifying to construct an Other who remains untainted. We never read that the Other

should resist toilets or vaccines but rather the temptations of Disneyland and Citibank. Who is tempted here?

To understand how globalized the United States has become, let's look at Ohio. This "Rust Belt" region lost tens of thousands of jobs after 1980, as steel mills and auto plants closed. Today about a thousand foreign companies have subsidiaries there, employing 200,000 local residents. Sixteen thousand Ohioans build most of the Accords driven in the United States at a $5 billion Honda facility. In 2004 the Japanese firm spent more than $7 billion buying auto parts from 175 suppliers in Ohio. Not only has it not laid off workers, it has hired many new ones. The average hourly rate of its nonunion workers is $23.20, excluding overtime and bonuses. Studies show that foreign companies pay 19 percent higher wages on average than American companies do. Throughout Ohio, foreign companies hired during a period (2000–2004) in which the state lost 225,000 jobs. The jobs were lost due to a variety of causes, mostly technology, but they were not replaced by American companies as much as by foreign companies. When General Motors spun off its parts-making Delphi subsidiary near Columbus, forcing it to compete in the world market for business, employment dropped from 5,500 in the 1970s to 860 in 2004. But Honda and new suppliers picked up the employment slack. In this respect Ohio represents the domestic face of globalization. Nationwide, foreign companies have made direct investments of $1.31 trillion in U.S. operations since 1994, while U.S. companies have made direct investments of $1.19 trillion in foreign operations, a net influx of $120 billion to the United States.

This globalization was key to the U.S. economic recovery after 9/11, and knowledge about how to accommodate it, I would argue, constitutes a new form of American cultural capital. For the most part, foreigners have purchased *existing* businesses in their areas of expertise and then expanded them. In northwest Ohio the leading gasoline chain is now British Petroleum, which bought Sohio, and chief among its rivals is Shell (owned by Royal Dutch Shell). The dominant grocery chain is Tops, a unit of Netherlands' Royal Ahold, which faces low-end competition from Germany's Aldi stores. Another Dutch firm, Reed Elsevier, bought LexisNexis, the Ohio database company, in 1994. The Luxottica Group of Italy bought the local eyewear chain LensCrafters in 1995. Comp USA, owned by a Mexican family, is now Ohio's leading computer vendor. Cement for highway and building projects comes from Cemex, a Mexican company. Henkel of Germany bought adhesives maker Manco in 1998 and OSI

Sealants in 2004. The Royal Bank of Scotland bought Charter One Financial, a major Ohio bank chain, for $10.5 billion. The 7-Eleven stores in Ohio are, of course, controlled by Japan's Ito-Yokado. The Circle K's, Dairy Marts, and Dunkin' Donuts in northern Ohio are owned by Alimentation Couche-Tard of Canada. The Crate and Barrel stores and Spiegel are owned by the Otto Group of Germany. The Sbarros and Burger Kings are owned and operated by Diageo, a British company. Cleveland's steel mills had Japanese, then Brazilian, and now German owners. The venerable Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. was purchased by Camozzi SpA of Italy in 2004, which fortunately kept it in Ohio; not only is the tool-and-die business essential to national defense, but it employs thousands of Ohioans. On my university campus, the faculty order books through Random House (Germany's Bertelsmann) and the food services are provided by Sodexho (France). Global companies have brought new expertise and new ways of doing business to Ohio.

The United States is already more globalized than any other nation. But even its educated citizens don't realize the extent to which they themselves have *chosen* to globalize. Take local grocery stores, where we might suppose that our choices were predominately domestic. We think we recognize the "foreign." That Dannon yogurt is French, and those Goya products are Mexican, right? Actually, all Dannon yogurt sold in the United States is produced at three U.S. plants, including one at Minster, Ohio, that turns out 3 million yogurt cups a day. Dannon does $18 billion a year in business in the United States. When we reach for a Lipton, Hellmann's, Birds Eye, or Slim-Fast product, do we realize that we're buying from Great Britain's Unilever? It makes more than a thousand brands of food that are sold through three hundred subsidiary companies in eighty-eight countries worldwide—brands such Knorr, Ragu, Bertolli, Dove, Pond's, Lux, and Surf that we use every day.

Most of us don't realize that we're shopping at foreign-owned stores or that we're buying foreign-produced products. Recently at my grocery, I bought a bag of Archway Ginger Snaps. Great taste and very crisp, reminding me of Italian *biscotti.* And no wonder. When I read the label, I learned they are baked in California by Parmalat, an Italian company, which makes the Archway, Salerno, Delicious, Frookie, and Mother's brands of cookies. Parmalat also produces the Beatrice, Lactaid, Soy, and Parkay product lines.

If I were properly suspicious of globalization, I would also stay away from Dr Pepper and 7 UP—those are British (Cadbury-Schweppes). I'd avoid Miller beer (SABMiller of South Africa) as well as Labatt's, Rolling

Rock, and Corona (Belgium's Interbrew). And no Lifesavers, Lean Cuisine, Alpo, Friskies, Hill Brothers, MJB, Dreyer's ice cream, or Stouffer's products (a few of the thousands of Nestlé brands). In the magazine aisle, I'd avoid *Car and Driver* (LaGardère, of France) and *Hot Rod, Guns & Ammo, Snowboarder, Motor Trend,* or *Teen* (E-Map of Britain) as well as *Family Circle, Parents,* and *Child* (Bertelsmann of Germany).

Just for contrast, let's return to that French Géant Casino grocery discussed in chapter 2. Remember how the "foreign" foods were rigorously separated in separate aisles? In the "United States" aisle were Skippy peanut butter, Kellogg's corn flakes, Uncle Ben's rice and pancake mix, Heinz ketchup, A-1 steak sauce, and Gallo wines. There was a sprinkling of Lever products from Britain, which we might be misled into thinking American, and a dozen canned goods from German firms. The world's second largest economy, Japan, was represented by Kikkoman soy sauce and Sapporo beer. This sector of the French economy is rigorously protected from globalization. Has it retained more local culture? Possibly. Are the French better off? They spend twice as much of their disposable income as Ohioans do just feeding themselves. Their unemployment rate hovers around 12 percent. No one is rushing to invest in the French economy.

Back in the Rust Belt, Ohioans have gained the cultural capital of globalization, which is a close knowledge of how and when its bilevel system works for and against them. For example, there are unionized American and nonunionized foreign auto plants in Ohio, and there is a labor force that is conscious of the pluses and minuses of each workplace, even if they haven't worked there. There are thousands of designers, tool-and-die workers, and sales people who work for large and small auto parts suppliers that compete for American and foreign auto companies' parts contracts. The intensity of this competition and the efficiency demanded of them in order to reduce costs is stunning to witness, and it has created an ability to design quickly, adapt quickly, and to eliminate steps in processes. Thomas Friedman has called this a "flat world," but that's wrong. The metaphor is anachronistic. There's nothing flat about a world in which 60 percent of China is not connected to international transportation and the United States ranks fourteenth in Internet broadband connections. Rather we are approaching a bilevel world—multilocal and confluently global at the same time. In places like Ohio, the increased foreign presence internationalized the consciousness of Ohioans, who now understand differing manufacturing processes, standards, and sizes, different product uses and packages. The foreigners have shown Ohioans what they

do best, and synced them up with global buyers and sellers. They have also augmented Ohioans' cultural knowledge: sushi is Japanese, dim-sum Chinese, pho is Vietnamese. Everything we ship UPS goes through Louisville, which is not so far away. This is the database template they use in Germany, and Hondas made in Ohio can be just as good as Hondas made in Japan.

Having been globalized in this fashion, Ohioans increasingly understand what they do well by international standards, what they raise or produce that is unique, and what they have to do to stay at that level. They no longer measure themselves by local standards, the clearest indication that, impossible as it would be for most of them to express it, a new form of cultural capital is forming. A striking example was the announcement in August 2004 of a new "in-sourced" auto plant in Toledo. Three auto parts suppliers—two of them foreign—will collaborate with Daimler-Chrysler to build a $900 million Jeep plant. The suppliers will own the plant, Hyundai will supply the chassis, and Chrysler will build the Jeeps. "The concept has been tried overseas," said officials, "but it's new to the United States."[10] And it can't be done just anywhere; it requires cultural capital. Albeit intuitively, Ohioans understand direct foreign investment—it works!

The primary concern of critics of globalization has been that national cultures will become "standardized." Differences, they say, will be "leveled out" and products "homogenized." But it is difficult to think of egregious examples here in the United States. In fact, our own experience suggests that there will be more, rather than fewer, products and cultural choices. As I tried to show in chapter 3, it is the logistical systems that deliver them—financial services, container shipping, airfreight, computing—that will move toward standards, such as technological efficiency and economies of scale. These enable work *across* cultures. To the extent that logistical systems can, they accommodate local culture. For example, the language interfaces of ATMs can be local, but their logistical systems will be global. The cultural "local" endures.

There is often a misleading appearance of standardization where there is none. As discussed in chapter 2, most products or practices must be adapted to the tastes of the local market, which has deeply rooted ways. Thus we get the American version of "ramen," and the Japanese get their version of "cake." Even McDonald's "quarter-pounder," as Quentin Tarantino reminded us in *Pulp Fiction,* is a "Royale with cheese" and tastes differently in France. In Indonesia McD mostly sells very spicy chicken. It is not fast-food sellers who threaten to standardize cuisine, since their

trade depends entirely on cultivating local customers. The standardization is in the production and delivery systems of conglomerates such as ConAgra, Unilever, Nestlé, and Royal Ahold.

Yet even there, consumers are continually reinterpreting products. After a foreign product or practice has been domesticated, it can even be reintroduced to its market of origin in this new form and catch on again. A case in point is tequila, a drink of humble origins in Mexico. Middle- and upper-class Mexicans wouldn't touch the stuff in the 1960s. But *extranjeros* took an interest and began to produce it abroad, increasing the quality of the ingredients, refining the taste, and raising the price. In the 1980s Mexicans traveling in Europe discovered the designer tequilas and demanded them at home, creating a new market for a traditional drink.

Very little of this product diversification is culturally destabilizing. Even the logistical system with the most impact—the money market—has not shown itself capable of altering the foundations of folkways. The sudden outflow of funds from Mexico or Argentina, following their crises, didn't change the diet or language or TV-viewing habits of those nations' citizens. Argentines haven't given up meat for soy products, nor Mexicans corn for potatoes. Instead the globalization that proceeds from logistical technologies augurs a future that is, for lack of a better phrase, *smooth globalization.* The production of cars and computers, the functioning of the Internet, the distribution of films and other media, the flow of capital, and international travel and trade will function with fewer bumps, devaluations, or delays. The gradual decline of international trade barriers, the rise of outsourcing, and new production in lower-wage nations will lessen global inequalities in wealth and reduce some of the pressures of immigration.

Smooth globalization seems compatible with local cultural particularization. Its technologies support local languages, music, foods, and film. These are new market niches for its processes. Economists tell us that handicrafts and service specialties, from *chocolatier* to *masseur,* will increase in the future. The United States is already witnessing this trend. The seamless processes of smooth globalization will also create a demand for their phenomenological opposite—the local, particular, or *rough* and original culture. This desire for contrasts seems to be built into human nature. Effortless ATMs allow Ohioans to buy rhubarb and basil at local farmers' markets and Egyptian bankers to shop in the souk on the way home. A day spent in front of a computer may make the Japanese worker inclined to *koto* lessons in the evening. German engineers using CAD-

CAM all day take up pottery, woodworking, and watercolors in the evening. So far globalization has only smoothed the way to greater ethnic and language and religious particularization—in short, *greater diversity.* It has depended on reception and choice; it has promoted adaptation instead of imposition. How bad can that be?

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20. Data from Nielsen EDI, reported in *New York Times,* November 4, 2002. Sony and Buena Vista have traded the lead for several years, with the latter achieving a 20% market share in late 2003.
21. Kristin Thompson, *Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market, 1907–1934* (London: British Film Institute, 1986), 81.
22. Ibid., 140.
23. "Gente," *Reforma,* May 20, 1995, 4D.
24. Riera, in "Culture Watch," *News* (Mexico City), May 19, 1995.
25. "Culture Watch," *News* (Mexico City), May 17, 1995, 12.
26. Chang-Ran Kim, "Hopeful Multiplexes Spin Shaky Web, Bank on Hits," *Japan Times,* May 24, 2002.
27. Hirschberg, "Backstory," 91.
28. Alessandra Stanley, "Italians Can't Believe Ears: Movies Lose Their Voices," *International Herald Tribune,* September 17, 1998.
29. Puttnam, *Movies and Money,* 261.
30. Ibid., 274.
31. Ibid., 227.
32. "French Film Industry Fears Its Worst-Case Scenario," *International Herald Tribune,* December 27, 2001.
33. "Culture Wars," *Economist.* September 12, 1998.
34. Jameson, "Notes on Globalization," 58, 60.
35. "Culture Wars," *Economist,* September 9, 1998. See also O'Meara et al., *Globalization,* 454–78.
36. The Khmer stations have a website: www.tv9.com.kh/marketing_research.html.
37. The titles of some shows are in English, but the programming was all Japanese. Titles shown here in *romanji.* The top three shows of the families of my students at Kobe College in 2001 were as follows. Variety: (1) *Waratte iitomo,* (2) *Koimi Karasawagi,* (3) *Vo no moto.* Music: (1) *Music Station,* (2) *Utaban,* (3) *Love Love Aishiteru.* Cooking: (1) *Dochi no ryori show,* (2) *Chyu bo desuyo,* (3) *3 Minutes Cooking.* Drama: (1) *Tenkyoho no koibito,* (2) *Eien no Ko,* (3) *Nurse no oshigoto.* News: (1) *News Station,* (2) *Super Morning,* (3) *Tokudane.* Travel: (1) *Sekai Ururun Taizaiki,* (2) *Ainori,* (3) *Sekaimo Syasoukara.* Movies: (1) *Friday Road Show,* (2) *Saturday Wide Gekigyo,* (3) *Sunday Youga Gekigyo.*
38. Eric Pfanner, "Europe's Dashed Cable Hopes," *International Herald Tribune,* March 16, 2002.
39. Puttnam, *Movies and Money,* 282.
40. Michael Wines, "Moscow Journal: Wired Radio Offers Fraying Hope," *New York Times,* October 18, 2001.
41. David Nye, during question and answer session, European American Studies Association, Warsaw, Poland, March 21–25, 1997.
42. Divina Frau-Meigs, "The Cultural Impact of American Television Fiction in Europe: Transfer of Imaginary Worlds or Cultural Compatibility?" paper presented to the European American Studies Association, Warsaw, Poland, March 21–24, 1996, 5.

43. Ibid., 7, 8.
44. Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, *How to Read Donald Duck,* trans. and introd. David Kunzle (New York: International General, 1995; originally published 1984), 98.
45. John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 49.
46. M. Barker, in ibid., 43.
47. Michael Switow, "Philippines Is Cartoon Capital," *Plain Dealer* (Cleveland), October 10, 1996, A17.
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53. Ritzer and Malone, "Globalization Theory," 108.
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55. Frank Thomas, *New York Times Magazine,* December 31, 2000, B4.
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59. Wayne Arnold, "Malaysia's Internet Road Show," *New York Times,* August 23, 2001.
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63. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnational_corporation.
64. Jameson, "Notes on Globalization," 67.
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Chapter 2. The Resistance of the Local

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Essay on Sources

These abbreviations are used below: *IHT* (*International Herald Tribune*), *NYT* (*New York Times*), *PD* (*Plain Dealer* [Cleveland]), *WSJ* (*Wall Street Journal*).

Chapter 1. "Less Than We Think"

What Are We Talking about When We Talk about Globalization?

The word *habitus* is used by Pierre Bourdieu in *Homo Academicus,* trans. P. Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 194–227, to describe a culturally specific way not only of speaking and doing things, but of seeing, thinking, and categorizing. *Habitus* tends to be "naturalized." It is taken for granted or assimilated into the unconscious, so it becomes the context of action and shared understanding. The passages cited by Fredric Jameson are from his essay in *The Cultures of Globalization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), which he edited with Masao Miyoshi. Thomas Friedman has written often on globalization, most notably *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor, 2000) and *The World Is Flat* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

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Is English Conquering the World?

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The Ubiquitous American Film

Key books for understanding the history of U.S. film exports are Kristin Thompson's *Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market, 1907–1934* (London: British Film Institute, 1986), and Thomas Guback, *The International Film Industry* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969). Much of my understanding of protectionism and runaway production comes from David Puttnam's *Movies and Money.* John Izod offers an excellent overview of how VHS and DVD and overseas box office have changed Hollywood in *Hollywood and the Box Office* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

John Cones, a lawyer, has written the most detailed book on the head-spinning complexity of *The Feature Film Distribution Deal* (Carbondale: South-

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American Television and the Rise of Local Programming

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The McDonald's Brouhaha

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What about the Internet?

Most information on computer use is available, not surprisingly, on line. The Nielsen/NetRatings are at www.nielsen-netratings.com, while the NUA surveys are at www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html. VeriSign is at www.verisign.com/nds/naming/idn/value/market_research.

Matthew Zook is a one-man army when it concerns Internet use. His most recent book is *The Geography of the Internet Industry* (London: Blackwell, 2005), but he has numerous papers that spell out his findings, some available at his website, www.zooknic.com. For his domain name research, go to www.zooknic.com/Domains/international.html.

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Do American Companies Dominate the World Economy?

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The *New York Times* business pages gave figures on share of the auto industry in its September 4, 2003, issue: GM's 2002 market share was 25.5 percent, Toyota's was 14.3 percent, Ford's (including Volvo and Land Rover) was 13.5 percent,

Honda's was 13 percent, and DaimlerChrysler's was 6.3 percent. The best-selling vehicles were (1) Ford F-series light trucks, (2) Chevy Silverado light trucks, (3) Honda Accord, (4) Toyota Camry, (5) Dodge Ram light trucks, (6) Ford Explorer, and (7) Toyota Corolla. All Japanese models increased sales over the previous year, but only the Silverado increased sales among American vehicles. On Citgo and Venezuela, see Simon Romero and Alexei Rarrionuevo, "The Troubled Oil Company," *NYT,* April 20, 2005. Sherri Day and Tony Smith wrote "Interbrew Said to Be Near Deal for Brazil Brewer," *NYT,* March 2, 2004.

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Chapter 2. The Resistance of the Local

Language

Dusan Kecmanovic has given us one of the fullest and most convincing accounts of why ethnic and nationalistic thinking will not go away, in *The Mass Psychology of Ethnonationalism* (New York: Plenum Press, 1996). Two studies used extensively in this section of the book, which incidentally highlight the importance of local culture, are Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). For reportage on Japan, no one exceeds Norimitsu Onishi, "Japanese Workers Told from on High: Drop the Formality," *NYT,* October 30, 2003. Onishi recounts the famous 1975 case of a junior employee in Tokyo who was beaten to death when he refused to use the proper *keigo* with a senior colleague in a bar. For the changeover in Chinese, see David W. Chen "egap a nrut .S.U. ni srepapswen esenihC," *IHT,* March 28, 2002. The Chuvashi information is in Steven Lee Myers, "Russian Republics Assail Putin's Plan to Curb Autonomy," *NYT,* October 4, 2004.

Communicative Distance

On the *hikikomori* phenomenon, see Kathryn Tolbert, "They Won't Leave Their Rooms," *IHT,* May 31, 2002. Simon Rowe wrote an amusing review of capsule hotels, "Sure It's Tiny, It Has No View, but Hey, It's Home," *IHT,* March 16–17, 2002. The information on which nationalities travel came from "Euro: Single Currency," *IHT,* December 11, 2001, and Crispian Balmer wrote about Italians living at home: "30 and Still Living at Home," *IHT,* April 6, 2002.

Anthropologist Edward Hall's system of proxemics, detailed in *Beyond Culture* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1976), set out the terms *low context* and *high context.* Kurt Lewin, the "father" of group dynamics at MIT, had in the 1950s dubbed these *U-type* and *G-type,* and later developed "field theory." As the terms suggest, both are spatially oriented systems.

Food

Pierre Bourdieu's *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984) influenced this chapter, obviously, along with Sidney Mintz, *Tasting Food, Tasting Freedom: Excursions into Eating, Culture, and the Past* (Boston: Beacon, 1996). John Dower's *Embracing Defeat* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999) gives much useful context to modern Japanese eating habits. The information on breast-feeding comes from Lizette Alvarez, "Norway Leads Industrial Nations Back to Breast-Feeding," *NYT,* October 21, 2003, and Miriam Jordan, "Nestlé Markets Baby Formula to Hispanic Mothers in U.S.," *WSJ,* March 4, 2004, which quotes from an Abbott Labs study showing that in the United States 46 percent of Asian mothers, 36 percent of Caucasian mothers, 32 percent of Hispanic mothers, and 19 percent of black mothers were still breast-feeding their babies at six months. I also interviewed many mothers: my thanks to Akiko Hasegawa, December 2, 2000, and Naoko Kumise, June 24, 2004, in Japan, and Anne Luyot, Jacqueline Miquet, and Beatrice Laurent in France, November and December, 2001. On U.S. infant diets, see Mintz and also T. A. Badget, "Bad Eating Habits Start before 2, Study Finds," *PD,* October 26, 2003.

The failure of low-fat products is described by Bruce Horowitz, "Low-Fat Industry Loses Out as Consumers Favor Flavor," *USA Today,* October 15, 2001, which says that sales of low-fat products fell from 10 to 50 percent in every category between 1995 and 2001. Warren Hoge wrote about marmite: "It's Revolting—and Sublime," *IHT,* January 25–26, 2002. For details on Starbucks's overseas adaptations, read Susan Leung, "Overseas, Starbucks Learns as It Expands," *WSJ,* reprinted in the *Jerusalem Post,* December 16, 2003. For Chinese food shopping habits and cooling and warming flavors, see Geoffrey A. Fowler and Ramin Setoodeh, "Outsiders Get Smarter about China's Tastes," *WSJ,* August 5, 2004.

line Prices Take a Toll," *WSJ*, July 12, 2003. Alex Kerr's books on Japan are *Lost Japan* (Oakland: Lonely Planet, 1996) and *Dogs and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Japan* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001). See also James Fallows's *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995) and John Dower's *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 2000). David Yetman, "*Ejidos*, Land Sales, and Free Trade in Northwest Mexico," *American Studies* 41, nos. 2–3 (2000): 211–34, is the source of material on Mexico, but see also Wayne Cornelius and David Myhre's contributions to *The Transformation of Rural Mexico: Transforming the Ejido Sector* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1998), as well as Alberto Burquez's "Twenty-Seven: A Case Study in Ejido Privatization in Mexico," *Journal of Anthropological Research* 54, no. 1 (1998): 73–95, and John Womack's *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1970). On French urban planning, I found Gilles Blieck's *Les Enceintes Urbaines, XIII–XVI siècle* (Nice: Editions du CTHS, 1999) very helpful.

Tribalism

Racism shows up in other Japanese sports besides baseball. Until the ascent in the 1990s of Akebono, a Hawaiian, no foreigner had ever reached the top group of *sumo*. By 2001 there were several Mongolians in the second *juryo* group, as well as—gasp!—a black American named Henry Miller. Miller's heavily muscled body (he trained with weights) led newspaper commentators to allege that *gaijin*—who are "genetically different"—would ruin *sumo* by introducing steroids. They urged a ban.

Kofi Annan's critique of African racism is in "The Politics of Globalization," an address presented at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., September 17, 1998. Reprinted in O'Meara et al., *Globalization*, 125–30. Senegal's president Abdoulaye Wade quoted by Joseph R. Gregory, "In Mali, a Fragile Democracy," *IHT*, April 26, 2004. The Hem and Lendus conflict in Congo detailed by Somini Sengupta, "French Soldiers Arrive in Congo with a Tough Mission," *NYT*, June 7, 2003. For more on Mozambique and Zimbabwe, see Michael Wines, "We Welcome You to Lush Zimbabwe! Your Wallet, Please!" *NYT*, November 19, 2003. On Rwanda, read Gil Courtemanche's *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali* (New York: Knopf, 2003). The "logo did it" view of African racism is George Packer's "Letter from the Ivory Coast: Gangsta War," *New Yorker*, November 3, 2003. Twenty years earlier V. S. Naipaul had depicted a decline into tribalism in "The Crocodiles of Yamoussoukro," *New Yorker*, May 23, 1983.

Seymour Hersh revealed Israeli aid to the Kurds in "Plan B," *New Yorker*, June 28, 2004. On Spanish anti-Moroccan violence, see Marlise Simons, "Resenting African Workers, Spaniards Attack," *NYT*, February 12, 2000. On Austria, see Steven Erlanger, "How the Viennese Rushed to 'Aryanize' Property," *IHT*, March 8, 2002. On the problems of German companies in foreign acquisitions, see

Matthew Karnitschnig, "A Newspaper War in Poland Tests Europe's Barriers," *WSJ,* October 20, 2004. Violence in India detailed in Rajiv Chandrasekaran's "'Both Sides Were at Fault,' in India," *IHT,* March 7, 2003, and on caste, see Joseph Berger, "Family Ties and Entanglements of Caste," *NYT,* October 25, 2004, and Katharine Boo, "The Best Job in Town," *New Yorker,* July 5, 2004.

Tonga's problems came to light in "Royal Jester's Date in Court No Joke," *South China Morning Post,* June 6, 2002. On Mexican intrafamilial racism, see Jacqueline Fortes de Left, "Racism in Mexico: Cultural Roots and Clinical Interventions," in *Family Process* 41 (Winter 2002): 619. On Brazilian slavery, see Larry Rohter, "Trapped Like Slaves on Brazilian Ranches," *IHT,* March 26, 2002, while Anthony Faiola reported on *The Simpsons* in "The Cartoon That Riled Rio," *IHT,* April 18, 2002.

Corruption

The Corruption Perceptions Index is available at www.transparency.org. The "Data and Research" section, for 2002, pp. 224ff., identified fourteen sources for its data: World Bank Group, World Economic Forum, World Business Environment Survey, Institute of Management Development, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, The Economist Intelligence Unit, and Freedom House. Other studies mentioned were authored by the Control Risks Group; Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index; The Conference Board; Transparency International; World Bank PREM Network; Latinobarometer; Afrobarometer; International Crime Victims Survey; New Europe Barometer; and several other organizations.

The Bribe Payers Index is conducted by Gallup International for Transparency International; it is contained in the larger Corruption Perceptions Index, pp. 237–39. The study on the "Amount Corruption Adds to Bureaucrats' Salaries" is contained in the Global Corruption Report, pp. 296–98, www.globalcorruptionreport.org.

Stephan Faris reported on oil companies in Nigeria in "Oil Giant Could Do Better in Nigeria," *Fortune,* October 1, 2001. For more on Argentina's fleecing of bondholders, see Matt Moffet, "After Huge Default, Argentina Squeezes Small Bondholders," *WSJ,* January 14, 2004. Thomas Friedman in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* has many revealing anecdotes on corruption. For more on the embeddedness of corruption in Southeast Asia, see Cas W. Vroom, *Indonesia and the West: As Essay on Cultural Differences in Organization and Management* (Jakarta: Catholic University Press, 1981), and Emmanuel Todd, *The Explanation of Ideology: Family Structures and Social System* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

Smuggling and Counterfeiting

Timothy W. Ryback's *Rock around the Bloc* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) is an enjoyable way to start reading. Peter Jaszi and Martha Wood-

mansee have collected a variety of academic approaches to the problem in *The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).

Tim Phillips, in "A Web of Corporate Cops and Robbers," *IHT* Biztech, March 28, 2003, lists the nations using pirated business software, a role call of the underdeveloped world, led by Indonesia (89%), Ukraine (89%), and Russia (88%), but it is worth noting that 25 percent of the business software used in North America and 35 percent of that used in Europe is also pirated

Taxes

The tax compliance rates are available from Transparency International and are cited in "Global Survey Cites Creeping Corruption," *NYT,* October 8, 2003. The Lebanese tax mess is described by Salim Yassine, "In Beirut, a Taxing Situation," *IHT,* February 7, 2002.

The Resistance of the Local

On Japanese and American savings rates, see Justin Doebele, "The El Dorado of Japan," *Forbes Global,* October 15, 2001. Carol Hymowitz explains European deodorant use in "European Executives Give Some Advice on Crossing Borders," *WSJ,* December 2, 2003. On Whirlpool's different washing machines, see Miriam Jordan and Jonathan Karp, "Machines for the Masses," *WSJ,* December 9, 2003.

Chapter 3. "More Than We Know"

ATMs

For information on Don Wetzel and his colleagues' invention of the ATM, see inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blatm.htm. Other claimants are Barclay's Bank of England, which claims to have had the first "cash dispenser" in 1967, but its machine simply exchanged bank script for ten-pound notes, and the OMRON-Taiyo Corp. of Beppu, Japan, which claims to have "developed and delivered" the "first in the world" cash dispenser in 1971. I have found no photos or other substantiation for this claim either. Foreign use of ATMs will probably continue to rise even as U.S. use appears to have crested. According to *ATM & Debit News,* 65 percent of American households used the machines in 2000, but only 57 percent in 2003, as they were replaced by debit card purchases. See Sasha Talcott, "U.S. Moves Closer to Cashless Economy as ATM Use Falls," *PD,* July 22, 2004. Information on number of ATMs over the years comes from "world situation today" at www.rbrldn.demon.co.uk/history.htm. The information is taken from *The Global ATM Market to 2004,* published by Retail Banking Research Ltd. Also see http://military.bankrate.com/mtry/green/atm/atm4a.asp?prodtype=bank.

Sales figures are closely guarded, but some information is available at company websites, such as www.tritonatm.com. Craig Karmin is the source of the

information on South Korean and Chinese ATM and credit card use: "China Prods Its Consumers to Use Plastic," *WSJ*, December 4, 2003. Eric Bellman wrote the wonderful story on ATMs in India: "In India, Small Savers Mean Big Profit," *WSJ*, July 7, 2004. For more on the Hong Kong and Singapore stored value cards, see Evan Ramstad, "Hong Kong's Electronic-Money Card is Hit," *WSJ*, February 10, 2004.

The Money Market

Despite its metaphors, Thomas Friedman's chapter on money markets in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* is still the best place to begin reading on this subject. My account relies on many of his details. For more complex analysis, see Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: New Press, 1999). On the failure of "development economics," see William W. Lewis, *The Power of Productivity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), especially 135–228. My thanks to my colleague Asim Erdilik at the Weatherhead School, CWRU, for reading this section and suggesting improvements. For more on the way foreigners' investments in the United States have kept interest rates low, see Alan Murray's column, "Rates Lay Bare Greenspan Challenge," *WSJ*, June 1, 2005. The *Economist* has written extensively on foreign direct investment: see December 25, 1997 (cited by Friedman, 121) and the argument of April 16, 2005, for flatter tax rates, as well as "The New Kings of Capitalism," *Economist*, November 27, 2004.

Flexible Manufacturing

Fifteen years ago, this type of foreign investment accounted for only 0.4 percent of the gross domestic product of underdeveloped nations. By 2000 it had quintupled to 2 percent, and it appears set to rise to 5 percent by 2010 according to the UN Commission on Foreign Trade and Development. For more on Toyota, read Norihiko Shirouzu and Sebastian Moffett, "Toyota Closes in on GM," *WSJ*, August 4, 2004. Information on Flextronics can be found at www.tdctrade.com/imn/04062404/consumerele032.htm and in Jeffrey M. O'Brien's "The Making of the Xbox," *Wired*, issue 9.11, November, 2001.

Franchising

The word *franchise* dates to the twelfth century and derives from the French *franc* or *franche*, to be free, especially in judgments moral and metaphysical (*Petit Robert: Dictionnaire de la langue française* [Paris: Le Robert, 1986], 822–23). Historic examples in this section are from Robert Rosenberg and Madelon Bedell, *Profits from Franchising* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969); Robert M. Dias and Stanley I. Gernick, *Franchising: The Investors' Complete Handbook* (New York: Hastings House, 1969); and Michael R. Czinkota, Ilkka A. Ronkainen, and John J. Tarrant, *The Global Marketing Imperative* (Lincolnwood, Ill.: NTC Business Books, 1996).

On McDonald's adoption of credit card sales, see Jathon Sapsford, "As Cash Fades, America Becomes a Plastic Nation," *WSJ*, July 23, 2004. Joel Millman and Ann Zimmerman tell Roxana Orellana's story in "'Repats' Help Payless Shoes Branch Out in Latin America," *WSJ*, December 24, 2003; Australian franchising by Julie Bennet, "Foreign Franchise Concepts Find Growth Opportunities in U.S. Market," *WSJ*, March 8, 2004; and Kumon Learning Centers by Suein Hwang, "Pre-K Prep: How Young Is Too Young for Tutoring?" *WSJ*, October 13, 2004.

Airfreight

The effects of the 9/11 air traffic delays were reported by Mark Landler, "Air Cargo Delays Have a Ripple Effect," *IHT*, September 15, 2001, and James Brooke, "Attacks Cause a Ripple through Japan's Economy," *IHT*, September 21, 2001.

On the history of airfreight in the United States, see Richard Malkin, "An Air Cargo Century," *Air Cargo World On-Line* (2000), www.aircargoworld.com/archives/feat1janoo.htm. The FedEx website is at www.fedex.com/us/about/express/history.html and Magic Millions-IRT at www.magicmillions.com.au/air_freight.html. On Apopka greenhouses, see Florida Agricultural Statistics Service reports, on line at www.nass.usda.gov/fl/hort/f&fcg98.htm.

On Chinese air cargo services, see Amy Schatz and Rick Brooks, "Polar Air Cargo Wins Rights to U.S.-China Service," *WSJ*, September 7, 2004, www.aircargoworld.com/archives/feat2dec99.htm, and Cathay Pacific, *Freighter Flight Schedules* (Hong Kong, 2004). For per mile cost figures and much other interesting data, read Hendrik Tennekes, *The Simple Science of Flight: From Insects to Jumbo Jets* (Boston: MIT Press, 1996).

Containerized Freight

Statistics on New York–New Jersey ports and the *Hyundai Glory* come from Eric Lipton's extensive series in *NYT*, "New York Port Hums Again, with Asian Trade," November 22, 2004, and "Beneath the Harbor, It's Dig or Else," November 23, 2004. Information on the SS *Elizabethport* and Oakland container port is at www.portofoakland.com/about/history.html. On Hong Kong, see http://geography.miningco.com/library/faq/blqzenclosedbuilding.htm. The *South China Morning Post* follows this industry closely; see "Overstretched Kmart Files for Bankruptcy," January 23, 2002. To learn about the Maersk line, go to www.maerskline.com/vessels. Tokyo's Shinogawa Terminal details at www.kouwan.metro.tokyo.jp/kowane/rekisi/rekisie.html. Los Angeles and Long Beach port capacities from the World Bank Study by Paul O. Roberts, "Trends in Inter-Regional Goods Movement," at www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/transport/ports/trf_docs/trends.pdf. On the ILU, start with www.metrans.org/Research/draft_reports/AR_04-02_final_draft.htm. For the Los Angeles and Long Beach port battles, see Daniel Machalaba, "U.S. Ports Hit a Storm," *WSJ*, March 10, 2004. On Detroit's problems, see Christopher M. Singer, "Neighborhood vs. Business,"

Detroit News, January 9, 2001 (on line at http://detnews.com/2001/detroit/0109/19/s06-296861.htm). Vietnam's new ports described at http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/2001-02/19/Stories/04.htm. The World Bank's report on roads and walking is at www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/pov&sa.htm.

Bar Codes

Two key resources are Tony Seideman's "Bar Codes Sweep the World," *American Heritage of Invention and Technology* 8, no. 4 (Spring 1993), which is cited at: www.inventionandtechnology.com/xml/1993/4/it_1993_4_toc.xml, and Roger C. Palmer, *The Bar Code Book: Reading, Printing, and Specification of Bar Code Symbols* (Peterborough, N.H.: Helmers, 1995). For more on warehouse space optimization, www.syware.com/reflib/hanimp.htm, and on RFIDs, see Chris Seper, "Radio Shipping Tags, Ready or Not!" *PD,* July 28, 2004.

Computing

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Logistics

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Conclusion

William T. Stead's book, *The Americanization of the World* (New York: Garland, 1972), is available in reprint. For historic definitions of *Americanization*, see the *Oxford English Dictionary*, compact edition (1971), 1:70. Gordon Wood's book is *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin* (New York: Penguin, 2004). Luigi Barzini wrote insightfully (and humorously) about differences between the United States and Europe in *Oh America, When You and I Were Young* (New York: Viking, 1985) and *The Europeans* (New York: Penguin, 1984). Paul Fussell's observations are in *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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